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Introduction 
The question of the place and role of subject in Foucault has given rise to a multitude 
of new questions and potential uses (and abuses) of his work. In the English-
speaking world, Eric Paras’ controversial Foucault 2.0 (2006) is a good example of the 
positions taken and the resistance that followed. What cannot be taken lightly is that 
as more of Foucault’s work becomes available in English, the more we encounter 
statements that come to many as a shock. The careful reader, however, will note 
(and many have) that these ‚shocking‛ statements on the subject have been available 
in English for some time. With all the novelty and excitement of this ‚new‛ 
quandary in Foucault studies, it seems appropriate to return to some of those texts 
that, at the very least, precede the more recent revelations. Two of these texts are the 
early translations of Foucault’s 1978 interview with the Italian Marxist, Duccio 
Trombadori. 
 In this unique interview, we find that Foucault pays special attention not only 
to the constitution of the subject in general, but also to the constitution of the author 
through the act of writing. To be more specific, the most notable example he gives is 
himself. On more than one occasion, he uses the self-referential term ‚experience,‛ a 
word that many see as an opening move to a ‚humanist Foucault.‛ This theme of 
‚the writing of the self‛1 would continue to be of special interest to him, but that is 
not the only reason why this interview is particularly important to remember.  
The production of the interview into an English language text was itself 
controversial. It appeared first with the title, Remarks on Marx, in 1991, and then 
reappeared in a new translation with the title ‚An Interview With Michel Foucault‛ 
                                                 
1  For a more detailed treatment of this as it relates to education and teaching, see: John  
Ambrosio, ‚The Writing of the Self: Ethical Self-Formation and the Undefined Work of 
Freedom,‛ Educational Theory, v. 58, no. 3 (August 2008), 251-267. 
Rocha: review essay of Remarks on Marx and Power 
132 
 
in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (2000). This peculiar way in which the 
two translations of the same interview have ‚become books,‛ so to speak, is striking 
when we consider the question within the actual interview about the constitution of 
books and their authors. So, by looking at the actual production of this text itself we 
access a unique entry into the deeper question of the central theme of Foucault’s 
work: the constitution of the subject. 
Before doing so, however, I would like to avoid what I see as a mistaken 
interpretation of Foucault’s affinity for the subject. In order to do so, I would like to 
go back to the question Foucault asked about this topic a full decade earlier in 1968 
and 1969 (in The Order of Things and What is an Author?) and point out that there 
need not be a discontinuous reading of Foucault’s supposed polemics on the subject. 
From that cautionary point of view, this featured interview should not appear as a 
novel topic for discussion. We might even come to understand Foucault’s thoughts 
on the production of the subject through writing as a continuation of the question he 
raises in What is an Author? 
I will then offer a comparative analysis of the two different publications of 
the 1978 interview and, in doing so, raise the provocative question Foucault brings 
up in the interview, namely: How are experience books born?  The analysis will end 
with two ‚identical‛ passages from the texts that leave the reader to ruminate on 




What I hope to do in this first portion of the essay is to clarify my position on the 
placement of Foucault’s interest in the subject within the chronology of his oeuvre by 
relating his 1978 interview with Duccio Trombadori to his 1969 lecture and essay, 
What is an Author?, published between the appearance of The Order of Things and 
Archeology of Knowledge. My main point here is that one need not periodize Foucault 
to find fruitful engagement with his deep interest in the human subject, particularly 
the person who writes books (in the case of What is an Author?) or the books 
themselves (in his interview with Trombadori). In other words, unlike many of the 
polemics surrounding the issue of Foucault’s affinity for the subject that seem to 
require a certain abandonment or revision of his early and middle work, I do not see 
such tidy divisions as exegetically necessary or as adding value to a more robust 
understanding of the work of this particular human subject and author, that is to 
say, the writer of these particular books: Michel Foucault. 
Another, more familiar, way of framing this issue outside the scope of the 
controversial question of whether Foucault was or became a humanist is by 
revisiting the question of whether or not he was a structuralist. Of course, these two 
questions are really one and the same because they cut to the indispensable issue: 
are we actually studying Michel Foucault—the man? What I mean to suggest here is 
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that the very question, ‚Who is Foucault?‛—or, to put it another way, the study of 
Foucault as a historically intelligible person—cannot ignore the inconvenient reality 
that we call him by name and attach that name to ‚his‛ books. And, we use that 
name, which we assume to be his own, as a name that gives him a real identity for 
us, because we assume to be speaking about him in the usual way we do with 
everyone else.  
So, from the very outset of our investigation we must agree, at least in 
practice, that Foucault is someone: a person, an ego and so forth. At the very least he 
is a somesuch, as Butler puts it, meaning that he is at least ‚something‛ in the 
ontological sense. None of this delineates what kind of a thing a person is; there is 
nothing easy about making sense of what we mean by those person-things we so 
often take for granted, but, in addressing the very idea of authorship, the production 
of books, and the constitution of the subject through such literary events, I think that 
whether one considers it a matter of structuralist or humanist orientation, the brute 
force of Foucault’s selfhood will be difficult to avoid. What is especially exciting to 
me about this matter is that Foucault himself saw the need to confront this issue 
during the very heart of what is widely considered to be his ‚post-human‛ period.  
To make this point I will deal with two texts (The Order of Things and What is 
an Author? in the order in which they were published) in order to preface and 
contextualize Foucault’s 1978 interview with Trombadori. Before I do, however, let 
me be clear: I do not see Foucault’s late period as discontinuous from his earlier 
ones. Even though the 1978 interview is a part of this ‚later‛ period of work, I do not 
want to make too much of it. Making my argument in this way should not only 
bolster the idea that Foucault’s productive relationship with the subject is here to 
stay in Foucault studies, it should also serve to erode some the interpretations that 
seem to conveniently divide him into time-exclusive things. 
 
The Order of Things & Phenomenology 
In The Order of Things, Foucault appears to engage in an all-out offensive against 
phenomenological humanism and this is usually understood to mean that he is also 
opposed to the human subject, at least during this period of his work. In his 
foreword to the English translation, he remarks that while discourse should remain 
open to ‚different methods,‛ there is one method that he rejects outright. This, of 
course, is phenomenology. He writes:  
 
If there is one approach that I do reject, however, it is that (one might call it, 
broadly speaking, the phenomenological approach) which gives absolute 
priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to act, which 
places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity – which, in short, leads 
to a transcendental consciousness.2    
                                                 
2  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Random House, 1994), xiv. 




What is important to note is that Foucault’s opposition in this passage is, primarily 
(if not exclusively), methodological.  
  It is true that underpinning these words was the Parisian struggle between 
the ‚old school‛ of Sartre and the emerging ‚new schools‛ of structuralist and post-
structuralist thought. It is also indisputable that the brunt of Foucault’s attack seems 
to fall on the ‚observing subject.‛ This polarizing caricature, however, can be 
misleading. The subject is not the primary victim. It is, rather, a matter of the 
‚absolute priority‛ given to the ‚observing subject‛ in phenomenological method. In 
other words, Foucault’s contention is not that phenomenology is wrong outright. It 
is instead that the way (or method) by which the phenomenologist approaches 
things is misguided. Misguided, that is, by the priority of the observing subject and 
transcendental ego, which, conveniently, happens to be the phenomenologist herself.  
  A critic might respond by citing passages throughout The Order of Things 
where there is evidence to bolster an argument that Foucault is directed against the 
actual ‚man‛ or ‚subject,‛ not against philosophical method. For example, Foucault 
ends by writing ‚<that man would be erased, like a face in the sand.‛3 We might 
observe, however, that if this were the case Foucault would have set himself up, so 
to speak. If his purpose really were to ‚erase‛ the subject, then he would have to 
begin with himself. But, if his point remains methodological, as it was in the 
beginning, then the subject can retain its face, albeit differently from before.  
  Insofar as Foucault has a face and hands—a self—that freely thought and 
wrote and felt and wondered, it seems that he must be offering a much more ironic 
and different erasure of ‚the face‛ than one framed by a simplistic distaste for 
phenomenology. In the end we can say that Foucault was not necessarily opposed to 
phenomenological method in toto. Instead, we might simply maintain that he 
rejected any method that prioritizes the subject as supreme knower, the Godhead, 
the face, leading to notions of transcendental consciousness.  
 In other words, Foucault’s opposition to phenomenology was not, so it 
seems, in order to destroy ‚man.‛ Similar to misunderstandings of Derrida’s 
deconstruction, that wrongly assign a nihilistic destructiveness to things under 
erasure, so too with Foucault’s erasure of ‚man‛ in The Order of Things: we find that 
Foucault is not denying the phenomenological veracity of human existence. He 
seems only to resent the phenomenological, and exclusive, priority given to her. This 
interpretation suggests that Foucault—even the Foucault of The Order of Things, his 
most abrasive treatise against phenomenology—is opposing a rigid subject, a true 
‚man,‛ not phenomenology outright.  
Besides Foucault’s authorship of The Order of Things, what are we to make of 
the authors he frequently cites? This very question is addressed, and corrected, in 
What is an Author? And it is precisely this notion of authorship that displays 
                                                 
3  Foucault, The Order of Things, 387. 
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Foucault, at the height of his ‚post-human‛ powers, in harmony with the notion of 
‚an experience book‛ that he articulates a decade later in his interview with Duccio 
Trombadori. 
 
What is an Author? & The Literary Subject 
Lest one think that Foucault was oblivious of the points I made above, or that I am 
simply offering a convenient reading of his project, one need only look to his own 
words in What is an Author? In this essay he confronts the problem that ‚the author‛ 
presents to his thesis in The Order of Things: 
 
<my objective in The Order of Things had been to analyse verbal clusters as 
discursive layers which fall outside the familiar categories of a book, a work, or 
an author. But while I considered ‚natural history,‛ the ‚analysis of wealth,‛ and 
‚political economy‛ in general terms, I neglected a similar analysis of the author 
and his works; it is perhaps due to this omission that I employed the names of 
authors throughout the book in a naïve and often crude fashion.4 
 
In other words, Foucault shows himself to be highly sensitive to the problematic of 
the self as writer. Later on he places this literary sense of subjectivity against the 
more general question of the subject when he writes: 
 
Is it not possible to reexamine, as a legitimate extension of this kind of analysis, 
the privileges of the subject? Clearly, in undertaking an internal and 
architectonic analysis of a work (whether it be a literary text, a philosophical 
system, or a scientific work) and in delimiting psychological and biographical 
references, suspicions arise concerning the absolute nature and creative role of 
the subject. But the subject should not be entirely abandoned. It should be 
reconsidered, not to restore the theme of originating subject, but to seize its 
functions, its intervention in discourse, and its system of dependencies.5  
 
These two passages make the argument that Foucault was not theorizing against or 
beyond the subject during this period, however complicating the questions of 
authorship (and others) are to his desired points. Also, his literary preoccupation 
with the subject is clearly not to abandon it completely; instead, he proposes what he 
would later say are the purposes of his work when he wrote: 
 
I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the last 
twenty years. It has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to 
elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to 
create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings 
                                                 
4  Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University  
Press, 1980), 113. 
5  Foucault, Language, Memory, Practice, 137. 
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are made subjects< Thus, it is not power, but the subject, that is the general 
theme of my research.6 
 
When we look at how this ties into the notion of an ‚experience book‛ that he 
articulated a decade later in his interview with Duccio Trombadori, I think it is safe 
to say that, while his thought is developing new layers all the time, there is no such 
radical break or discontinuity to be found between his earlier and later work; 
especially considering that if there were to be a time when he would have been 
entirely against the subject, this would have been it. Instead, we find a Foucault who 
is deeply interested in the question of constitution from beginning to end. In 
particular we find a keen interest in the literary aspects of constitution embedded in 
the questions of authorship and books. 
While this is something of a preliminary point in this review, it should make 
for a more productive analysis of the interview in question. Now we begin to 
consider the unique, and somewhat controversial, nature of the production of the 
actual texts of this interview and then move on to how the issue of its production 
helps to underscore the more general notion of how books constitute their author(s), 
in this case, Michel Foucault. 
 
The Birth of These Books: Remarks on Marx vs. An Interview with Michel Foucault 
Rather than begin with ‚these‛ books, I think that Nietzsche’s insight in the preface 
to Genealogy of Morals is indispensable to the work that lies ahead in this review. It 
both opens the general theme of the role of literacy (reading and writing) in 
Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s work and also brings to mind the role of the author. 
Nietzsche writes: 
 
If this book is incomprehensible to anyone and jars on his ears, the fault, it seems 
to me, is not necessarily mine. It is clear enough, assuming, as I do assume, that 
one has first read my earlier writings and has not spared some trouble in doing 
so: for they are, indeed, not easy to penetrate. Regarding my Zarathustra, for 
example, I do not allow that anyone knows that book who has not at some time 
been profoundly wounded and at some time profoundly delighted by every 
word in it; for only then may he enjoy the privilege of reverentially sharing in 
the halcyon element out of which that book was born and in its sunlight clarity, 
remoteness, breadth, and certainty. In other cases, people find difficulty with the 
aphoristic form: this arises from the fact that today this form in not taken seriously 
enough. An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been ‚deciphered‛ 
when it has simply been read; rather, one has then to begin its exegesis, for which 
is required an art of exegesis< To be sure, one thing is necessary above all if one 
is to practice reading as an art in this way, something that has been unlearned 
most thoroughly nowadays—and therefore it will be some time before my 
                                                 
6  Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954 - 1984 (New York: The New  
Press, 2000), 326-327. 
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writings are ‚readable‛—something for which one has almost to be a cow and in 
any case not a ‚modern man‛: rumination.7 
 
Here we find Nietzsche not only writing, but also telling his reader how to read his 
books. This is different from Foucault’s approach in this interview in one way, yet 
similar in another: Different, in that Foucault focuses on the production of the text 
through the author, not the reader; similar, in that Foucault demonstrates the same 
subjectivity as Nietzsche when he talks about ‚his books,‛ a subject position not 
unlike our own when we seek him within the pages he left us.   
  The imposing, material temporality of books arouses the same curiosity 
Foucault seems to have had of their authors: What is a book? Under what conditions 
does it appear? How is it born? It seems altogether inconvenient and distracting—
and therefore of great interest to Foucault studies—that books and their authors 
cannot be ignored entirely.  
  To further confound the matter, I am addressing a particular book that is not 
a book. It is an interview taken down and produced in print. Not only has it been 
produced, it has gone through linguistic reproduction: translation. The general issue 
of translation seems imposing enough, but, in this case, it has been translated twice. 
We have the 1991 English translation from the Italian translation of the ‚original‛ 
French (or French/Italian) interview done by Semiotext(e), titled: Remarks on Marx. 
And then there is the translation into English from the ‚original‛ French version 
taken from the authoritative Dits et Ecrits included in Power: Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault 1954-1984 (New Press, 2000): An Interview with Michel Foucault.  
  There are striking variations between the two and, perhaps even more 
interesting, is the manner in which we seek out the ‚original‛ one and what it might 
mean for a Foucault scholar to embark on such an originalist quest. The situation, it 
seems to me, is pregnant with meaning and tension. I would like to begin by noting 
some of the major contrasts between the two publications of the 1978 interview with 
Duccio Trombadori, and then ask some questions about how these texts further 
Foucault’s critical evaluation of the ‚order of things‛ and the ‚archaeologies of 
knowledge‛ without losing sight of his interest in the production of the subject. In 
this case, I am interested in something that touches on archeology, anthropology, 
and immortality: the production of Foucault via the ongoing birth of (his?) books.  
  The 1991 Semiotext(e) version, Remarks on Marx, took a great deal of liberty in 
transforming the interview into a full-fledged book. It bears: a title; a 1991 preface by 
R. J. Goldstein (the English-language translator); a note on the Italian-to-English 
translation; an English-language translation of the 1981 Italian-language 
introduction by Duccio Trombadori; and six chapters, each neatly titled and divided 
by subject or theme. Along with this are several promotional advertisements of 
                                                 
7  Friedrich Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. Edited by Walter Kaufman (New 
 York: Modern Library, 1992), 458-459 (italics in original). 
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various other books published by Semiotext(e). The book cites the first Italian 
publication of this interview as appearing in 1981, published by ‚10/17 cooperativa 
editrice,‛8 under the title, Colloqui con Foucault.9 The authorship of the book is 











Translated by R. James Goldstein 





  The 2000 New Press version, ‚An Interview with Michel Foucault,‛ is not a 
book really, at least not in the strong sense. It is an interview included in a 
collection—a bundle of editors’ selections of writings or, in this case, transcribed 
‚speakings‛—under a generic title that cites the interviewer (D. Trombadori) in an 
endnote and, in the same note, claims that the interview was first published in 1980 
(a year earlier than the claim made by Semiotext[e]) in the Italian journal, Il 
Contributo. With five editorial endnotes the interview is presented as a single entity, 
with no chapters or divisions, and a translation that reads quite differently and 
suggests that it is an entirely separate thing from the Semiotext(e) version. In fact, 
nowhere in the pages of the book—using the term ‘book’ in the weak sense—does 
any reference appear to the 1991 publication, not even a critical reference. The 
silence, of course, says a lot. Clearly, the controversy concerning the liberty taken in 
                                                 
8 While this title is only the name of the publisher (and bears no important relation to 
Foucault, as I see it), it may be useful to consider its meaning: I am not sure what the 
significance of the date, ‚10/17,‛ is, but I suspect that it has some politcal meaning. It also 
seems that the lowercase lettering is intentional and significant for the title. The English 
equivalent of the title would be: ‚the 10/17 editorial cooperative‛ (my translation). 
9  The Italian word colloqui is, of course, the plural form of the Latin-derived English  
cognate, colloquium (my translation). Semiotext(e) translated it into the more germane 
conversations. 
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the English publication almost a decade earlier created a need for a true(r) version of 
the interview. The complete omission of Remarks on Marx in ‚An Interview with 
Michel Foucault‛ gives the sense that the Semiotext(e) version is justifiably 
forgotten, quarantined, inferior, and wrong. If we want to find Foucault—the real 
Foucault—then, for us English-speakers without advanced French reading ability, 
we ought to look at the legitimate, 2000, version of the 1978 interview.  
  This basic contrast is perhaps too suggestive. I should note that an interview 
involves two or more people, of course. Until now, however, we almost get the 
impression that the only (important) voice is Foucault’s. This is certainly not the 
case. Especially in this particular interview. Here Trombadori, an Italian, plays a 
major role. This is not a traditional interview, not the kind we might call 
‚journalism.‛ In this case, Trombadori, a Marxist journalist and scholar, turns this 
interview into an interrogation, an agonistic exchange. His questions are not of the 
generic, information seeking, type; instead, there are frequent Marxist challenges to 
Foucault’s non/anti-Marxist positions. It is not easy to grasp in-advance or construe 
this interview under these uniquely agonistic terms, without reading the 
introduction that Trombadori wrote in 1981 that is included in the Semiotext(e), 
Remarks on Marx, version. I should add that I think that Trombadori’s introduction 
serves the reader well for the purposes of introducing Trombadori, but I do not find 
the actual points that Trombadori attempts to argue particularly persuasive, 
especially considering what Foucault says in the interview.  
  Nonetheless, lacking that introduction and Semiotext(e)’s of Trombadori’s 
personal profile that reveals that he was, ‚born in Rome in 1945, holds a degree in 
philosophy of law. The author of a study of the political thought of Antonio 
Gramsci, he has taught at the University of Rome. As a journalist, he has been editor 
of the cultural page of L’Unita. At the time of the publication of Colloqui con Foucault, 
he was political and parliamentary correspondent for the newspaper,‛10 we lack a 
great deal of context. 
  Furthermore, the primary English-language translator of the Semiotext(e) 
edition, R. J. Goldstein, also helps to frame the uniqueness of this interview in his 
preface that offers insightful commentary. He ends his brief prefatory remarks by 
writing, ‚In reply to Marx’s famous thesis that philosophers have hitherto only 
interpreted the world when the real point is to change it, Foucault would no doubt 
have argued that our constant task must be to keep changing our minds.‛ This, to 
me, is—interview aside—remarkably important. It strikes to the very heart of the 
Foucauldian-Marxist divide. Following Nietzsche, Foucault sees hermeneutics as 
change, whereas Marx grows impatient and calls for revolution. There is also a less 
polemical way to put this: interpretation is revolution. In other words, the hermeneutic 
task of changing our minds is the revolutionary art of exegesis and rumination, from 
which books are born.  
                                                 
10  Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), 15. 
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  Considering these mostly external differences, it is hard to decipher which 
book to accept and which one to reject. I think it is well understood that the literal 
translation of the Semiotext(e) edition is less suited to the purposes of hearing what 
Foucault has to say. However, to listen to the Italian Trombadori, it may suit the task 
just fine. In fact, we may find that Trombadori’s questions are ‚better‛ posed in the 
Italian-to-English translation. Yet, we seem to assume that Trombadori’s questions 
are marginal and unimportant. However, this is misleading. Just as it is somewhat 
misleading for the New Press to present such an austere and cold Trombadori, who, 
unlike Foucault, requires some introduction to general English-speaking readership.  
  These speculations are not to suggest which version the reader should choose 
or which is really the ‚good one‛ to have or purchase; instead, it is to ask the ironic 
questions: What does it mean for Foucault scholars to seek him out as though he 
could be found, as though he were hidden in his books or interviews, or what have 
you, and/or, what is the alternative? Should his disciples give up hope that Foucault 
will be resurrected as some kind of Christ? Is Foucault our Zarathustra, our Christ? 
What do we do when we are left with these words—this controversial canon of 
synoptic gospels, epistles, and testaments—that drift so far from their origins, from 
their true author?  
  These questions may be construed as passive-aggressive accusations of 
ignoring Zarathustra’s cutting words to believers. However, as Nietzsche noted in 
his preface to Genealogy, ‚every word‛ should profoundly wound and delight. We 
need not let go completely of this bookish quest because, as exegesis serves for 
Nietzsche to transform the inferior modern man into the superior ruminating cow, 
experimental writing serves Foucault to create experience books: books that (or 
should I say, who) transform the way we think and, subsequently, who we are. In 
this interview, using a different word than power, the book serves in the same 
powerful way to constitute the subject, or, more specifically, to change, and thereby 
constitute, Foucault himself, by his own admission.  
 
A Concluding Comparison 
To conclude, here are the same passages from the respective translations addressing 
the claims I have made about Foucault and experience books. The question that 
haunts them, as I see it, is still the question of the subject and her constitution: 
 
From Remarks on Marx (Semiotext(e), 1991): 
 
Many things have certainly been surpassed. I’m perfectly aware of having 
continuously made shifts both in the things that have interested me and in what 
I have already thought. In addition, the books I write constitute an experience for 
me that I’d like to be as rich as possible. An experience is something you come 
out of changed. If I had to write a book to communicate what I have already 
thought, I’d never have the courage to begin it. I write precisely because I don’t 
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know yet what to think about a subject that attracts my interest. In doing so, the 
book transforms me, changes what I think. As a consequence, each new work 
profoundly changes the terms of thinking which I had reached with the previous 
work. In this sense I consider myself more an experimenter than a theorist; I 
don’t develop deductive systems to apply uniformly in different fields of 
research. When I write, I do it above all to change myself and not to think that 
same thing as before.11 
 
From ‚An Interview with Michel Foucault‛ (New Press, 2000): 
 
Many things have been superseded, certainly. I’m perfectly aware of always 
being on the move in relation both to the things I’m interested in and to what 
I’ve already thought. What I think is never quite the same, because for me books 
are experiences, in a sense, that I would like to be as full as possible. An 
experience is something that one comes out of transformed. If I had to write a 
book to communicate what I’m already thinking before I begin to write, I would 
never have the courage to begin. I write a book only because I still don’t know 
what to think about this thing I want to think about, so that book transforms me 
and transforms what I think. Each book transforms what I was thinking when I 
was finishing the previous book. I am an experimenter and not a theorist. I call a 
theorist someone who constructs a general system, either deductive or analytical, 
and applies it to different fields in a uniform way. That isn’t my case. I’m an 
experimenter in the sense that I write in order to change myself and in order not 
to think the same thing as before.12 
 
 
Samuel Rocha, Doctoral Candidate & Gates Millennium Scholar,  
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11  Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 26-27. 
12  Foucault, Power, 239-240. 
